Taiwan Cyber War Game: What It Shows About U.S. Preparedness Gaps
By Leila Voss · November 20, 2026
Category: decoding-headlines-events
A think tank war game in Taiwan simulated Chinese cyber coercion without invasion. What it shows, what it claims, and what official sources say.
Key takeaways
The problem U.S. planning focuses on a Taiwan invasion, while cyber and economic coercion without invasion gets less preparation.
Core insight An FDD war game found recovery times are underestimated and no U.S. agency owns cross-agency tabletops for this threat.
Practical outcome Treat the findings as a think tank's account, and watch for official exercises with agencies and Congress.
A Chinese campaign against Taiwan might never fire a shot. It could start with cell towers that drop calls and end with weeks of unreliable power and payments. A war game held in Taiwan in late September tested that scenario, and its organizers say the United States is not ready for it.
The Foundation for Defense of Democracies (FDD) simulation was reported by Defense One on October 7, 2026. The findings were briefed to Taiwanese President Lai Ching-te and his national security team, according to the think tank, as reported in Defense One. We summarize what is confirmed, what the organizers claim, and what official sources say about the same threat.
What Is Confirmed
- FDD held a cyber exercise in Taiwan in late September 2026. It examined how Beijing could disrupt Taiwan's communications networks to extract political concessions without invading.
- Mark Montgomery, an FDD senior fellow and retired Navy rear admiral, helped lead it. Craig Singleton, FDD's China program director, played China.
- FDD said it hopes to run future exercises with congressional staff and federal agencies.
What the Organizers Claim
These points are the organizers' conclusions. They are not independent findings.
- The exercise began with localized cellular disruptions, information manipulation and pressure on satellite connectivity. A second phase escalated to damaged undersea cables, disabled electrical substations supporting telecommunications and strained backup networks.
- The aim of the simulated campaign was to make daily life less reliable and undermine confidence in Taiwan's government while avoiding direct confrontation with the United States.
- Taiwanese participants rerouted traffic and activated alternatives. The harder test, Singleton said, was whether those systems could sustain services for weeks as Beijing studied the response and targeted the backups.
- Montgomery said the Department of Defense sees the problem as one for other federal agencies, which "don't have a budget or a systematic process for running these kinds of tabletops."
"You know they're speaking in minutes and hours, and my experience is days or weeks."
- Mark Montgomery, FDD, on how policymakers underestimate recovery times, via Defense One
Tactical Context: Why Cyber and Coercion Fit Taiwan
Taiwan depends on a small number of undersea cables, a power grid with its own dependencies and imported energy. Disrupting those services does not require an invasion force, and it does not clearly cross the threshold that would trigger a military response. That is the logic of coercion below the level of war, often called gray-zone activity. Our Taiwan Strait analysis covers the military balance that cyber and coercion are meant to avoid testing.
Official U.S. sources describe a related threat. In an advisory, the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency, the National Security Agency and the FBI assessed that Chinese state-sponsored actors, known as Volt Typhoon, are seeking to pre-position themselves on IT networks for disruptive or destructive attacks on U.S. critical infrastructure "in the event of a major crisis or conflict with the United States," according to the CISA advisory AA24-038A. The agencies said the group had compromised multiple critical infrastructure organizations, including in Guam. The simulation did not name Volt Typhoon directly, Singleton said, but its activities influenced the game.
The Timeline Question
Defense One places the exercise against the wider assessment of Chinese intentions. The Office of the Director of National Intelligence said in its 2026 worldwide threat assessment that Chinese leaders did not currently plan to invade Taiwan in 2027 and had no fixed timeline for unification, and that Beijing preferred to achieve its goal without force while developing military options. More recently, U.S. officials have assessed an invasion before 2028 as increasingly unlikely, citing readiness delays and China's interest in Taiwan's next presidential election, per the same report.
Montgomery warned separately that early 2028 could bring intensified cyber and economic coercion if Taiwan's Democratic Progressive Party wins a fourth consecutive presidential election. That is his forecast, not an official one.
Strategic Implications
- Preparation gap. If the Pentagon treats resilience as an interagency matter and the agencies lack budgets for exercises, nobody owns the first month of a cyber coercion campaign.
- Recovery time. Planners who assume restoration in hours will mis-size reserves. Dependencies between services mean one restoration waits on another.
- Assistance timing. The organizers warn that gaps between military and civilian planning could delay U.S. help to Taiwan.
The chokepoint logic is familiar. Our Indo-Pacific chokepoints guide shows how a small number of sea lanes concentrate risk, and the same is true of cables and substations.
Limits
- The exercise results are a think tank's account. The full scenario and scoring have not been published in the reporting reviewed.
- A tabletop exercise reflects the assumptions of its designers. The Chinese team was played by an FDD analyst, not by an official.
- No attribution of any real outage to a Chinese campaign is made here.
What Resilience Looks Like
Defenders have a documented checklist, and it is not exotic. The CISA advisory recommends applying patches to internet-facing systems, prioritizing appliances known to be frequently exploited, using phishing-resistant multi-factor authentication, turning on and centrally storing logs, and planning for the end of life of unsupported technology. These steps deny an intruder the quiet access that a coercion campaign needs.
The simulation points to a second layer that checklists miss: sustained operation under pressure. Backup networks that work for a day may not work for a month if an adversary understands their dependencies. The practical response is to test fallback paths under realistic stress, to hold spare capacity for cables and power equipment, and to agree in advance which services get priority when capacity is short. These choices are budget decisions, which returns the discussion to Montgomery's point that no agency has the budget or the process to rehearse them.
For the United States, the same logic applies at home. Guam, named in the CISA advisory among the territories where Volt Typhoon compromised critical infrastructure, supports forces in the western Pacific. Resilience of civilian networks there is a military concern, not only a civil one.
Final Assessment
The exercise highlights a real planning gap, and the official record supports its core worry: Chinese actors have prepared access to critical infrastructure. What it cannot show is how Beijing would use that access or how fast Taiwan could recover. The immediate lesson is organizational. Someone must own cross-agency tabletops for cyber coercion, and the results should be tested against recovery times in days and weeks.
Frequently Asked Questions
What was the Taiwan simulation?
A September 2026 exercise run by the Foundation for Defense of Democracies. It tested Chinese cyber disruption of Taiwan's communications without an invasion.
Does the U.S. government see a Chinese infrastructure cyber threat?
Yes. A CISA, NSA and FBI advisory assesses that Chinese actors known as Volt Typhoon are pre-positioning on infrastructure networks for use in a major crisis.
Is a Chinese invasion of Taiwan expected in 2027?
The 2026 ODNI assessment, as reported by Defense One, said Chinese leaders did not currently plan to invade in 2027. U.S. officials see an invasion before 2028 as increasingly unlikely.
Why do recovery times matter?
Restoring one service often depends on restoring others first. Montgomery says policymakers speak in minutes and hours while experience shows days or weeks.