Strait of Malacca by the Numbers: 102,500 Ships, 23 Million Barrels a Day, and What a Closure Would Really Do

102,500. That is how many ships passed through the Strait of Malacca in 2025, about 280 a day, up from roughly 94,300 in 2024, according to Reuters. Hold that number in mind whenever anyone describes the strait as a gate that one actor could simply close. A waterway with that much traffic is a shared system, and the three states on its banks have said they intend to keep it that way.

This is a numbers brief. It takes six figures that explain the strait, says who published each and when, and states what each one leaves out. It builds on our earlier analysis of China's Malacca dilemma by asking a narrower question: what do the data support?

The Numbers at a Glance

• 102,500 ship transits in 2025, about 280 a day (Reuters, as carried by Baird Maritime, April 2026).
• 23.2 million barrels of oil a day in the first half of 2025, or 29% of maritime oil flows (U.S. Energy Information Administration).
• 48% of the strait's import volumes were bound for China in that period (EIA).
• 10.1 billion cubic feet a day of liquefied natural gas in 2024, up from 7.4 in 2020 (EIA).
• About 2.7 kilometers (1.7 miles) at the narrowest point, in the Phillips Channel (Reuters, via Baird Maritime; other sources differ slightly).
• 21 piracy and robbery incidents in the first half of 2026, down 74% from 80 a year earlier (ReCAAP, via Hellenic Shipping News).

102,500 Ships: A Shared System, Not a Gate

The ship count is the most useful number because it covers everything: tankers, container ships, bulk carriers and general cargo. Reuters reported the 2025 total of more than 102,500 transits in April 2026, when the crisis around the Strait of Hormuz pushed analysts to ask which other lanes carry a similar load. For the Hormuz context, see our explainer on the U.S. blockade of Iran.

What the figure leaves out is composition. It does not say how many of those ships carry oil, or how many are bound for a single country. What it does show is scale: a lane this busy runs on routine pilotage, a traffic separation scheme and coordination among coastal states. Disruption is more likely to come from an accident or a grounding than from a deliberate act.

23.2 Million Barrels a Day: The Largest Oil Chokepoint

The EIA ranks Malacca as the world's largest oil transit chokepoint, with an estimated 23.2 million barrels a day in the first half of 2025.

"This strait is the primary chokepoint in Asia and Oceania, with an estimated 23.2 million b/d of oil flow in 1H25, equivalent to 29% of total maritime oil flows."

- U.S. Energy Information Administration, World Oil Transit Chokepoints

The EIA series is stable: 22.8 million barrels a day in 2020, 22.1 in 2021, 23.0 in 2022, 24.0 in 2023 and 22.5 in 2024. Crude oil and condensate make up roughly two-thirds to three-quarters of the total. The figure counts barrels moving through the strait. It does not count barrels that could be rerouted, and it says nothing about stocks held in importing countries.

48%: The Share Bound for China

China accounted for 48% of the import volumes passing through Malacca in the first half of 2025, per the EIA. This is the number behind the phrase "Malacca dilemma," and it is real. A country that buys nearly half of the traffic has a large stake in the lane.

But the figure cuts both ways. A stake that large is also a stake in stability. The other half of the flow serves Japan, South Korea, Taiwan and other importers, so any sustained closure would hurt every major trading economy in Asia. The number measures dependence. It does not measure vulnerability, because vulnerability requires an actor able and willing to interdict the lane. No public evidence shows any state preparing to do so, and we make no claim about any government's plans.

10.1 Billion Cubic Feet a Day: LNG Is Growing

Liquefied natural gas flows through the strait rose from 7.4 billion cubic feet a day in 2020 to 10.1 in 2024, according to the EIA. The rise is a reminder that Malacca is no longer only an oil route. Gas buyers in Northeast Asia increasingly depend on the same lane, which widens the group with an interest in keeping it open.

The gas figure leaves out contract structure. Long-term LNG contracts and spot cargoes behave differently under stress, and the EIA series does not separate them. Treat it as a measure of exposure, not of how quickly buyers could switch suppliers.

2.7 Kilometers: The Narrow Point

The strait runs about 800 kilometers between the Malay Peninsula and Sumatra. The tightest point is in the Phillips Channel of the Singapore Strait, which Reuters, via Baird Maritime, puts at about 1.7 miles (2.7 kilometers) wide. Other sources give slightly different widths, so treat the exact figure as approximate.

Width matters for traffic management. A narrow channel makes a collision or a grounding disruptive. It does not make the channel easy to shut, because the waters are shared, heavily monitored and bordered by three states with an interest in keeping them open. Malaysia's foreign minister Mohamad Hasan said that "no unilateral decisions can be made about the strait," as reported by Reuters.

"the nations along the strait share a strategic interest to keep it open."

- Vivian Balakrishnan, Singapore's foreign minister, as reported by Reuters via Baird Maritime

21 Incidents: The Quieter Risk

The regional information-sharing centre ReCAAP reported 21 incidents in the Strait of Malacca and Singapore in January to June 2026, a 74% drop from 80 in the first half of 2025, as summarised by Hellenic Shipping News. ReCAAP described most incidents across Asia as opportunistic theft by perpetrators who took a "hit-and-run" approach.

The number tells you where daily security work is concentrated: coastal patrols, information sharing and boarding prevention. It does not tell you about severity, and a half-year drop can reverse. It is the best available measure of the risk that actually occurs, which is low-level crime, rather than the risk that dominates the debate.

What the Numbers Cannot Tell You

Three gaps matter. First, none of these figures describes intent. Traffic and oil volumes show dependence, not anyone's plans. Second, bypass routes are not captured. The EIA names the Sunda and Lombok straits, or a longer route around the archipelago, as alternatives. All of them add distance, time and fuel cost, and they run through the same Indonesian waters, so a diversion changes the cost of a voyage more than it removes regional dependence. An oil pipeline carrying Middle Eastern crude from Myanmar to southwest China exists, but we could not verify its throughput and a single pipeline is unlikely to match 23.2 million barrels a day.

Third, the data say nothing about rules. Reuters reported that Indonesia's finance minister, Purbaya Yudhi Sadewa, floated the idea of charging tolls on ships before saying such an arrangement was not possible. Fees and regulations are a more plausible form of change than a blockade, and no table captures them yet. Our analysis of how Washington positioned itself before the Xi meeting shows how often the strait enters great-power calculations.

What to Watch

• Any formal move by Singapore, Malaysia or Indonesia on tolls or new transit rules.
• The next ReCAAP half-year report, to see whether the 74% fall holds.
• The next EIA update on chokepoint flows, to see whether Hormuz disruption shifts barrels onto longer or alternative routes.

Final Assessment

The importance of the strait is not in doubt: 23.2 million barrels a day and more than 100,000 ships a year. What the numbers do not support is the idea of an easy chokepoint. The better reading is a shared utility whose users and whose neighbors all lose if it fails. The practical risks are accidents, crime and the slow drift of rules and fees, and they deserve more attention than the blockade scenario.

FAQs about the Strait of Malacca

How many ships pass through the Strait of Malacca?

Reuters reported more than 102,500 transits in 2025, up from about 94,300 in 2024, or roughly 280 a day.

How much oil moves through it?

The EIA estimates 23.2 million barrels per day in the first half of 2025, or 29% of total maritime oil flows.

Can the strait be bypassed?

Partly. Ships can use the Sunda or Lombok straits or sail around the archipelago, at added cost and time. A pipeline from Myanmar to southwest China carries a small share.

How wide is the narrowest point?

About 2.7 kilometers (1.7 miles) in the Phillips Channel, per Reuters. Sources vary slightly.

Is piracy a problem there?

Incidents fell 74% year on year in the first half of 2026 to 21, according to ReCAAP, and most are opportunistic theft.