Closed Airspace and U.S. Military Mobility: What the Eurasian Data Shows
By Declan Farr · November 18, 2026
Category: tactics-and-doctrine
A new commentary warns that closed airspace over Eurasia threatens U.S. military mobility. We check its figures and mark what remains an argument.
Key takeaways
The problem War in Ukraine and the Middle East has narrowed civil air routes across Eurasia, and the U.S. military leans on that civil system.
Core insight Civil rerouting data are specific, but the claim of cumulative risk to military airlift is a reasoned argument, not a measured result.
Practical outcome Treat the thesis as a hypothesis for official mobility studies to test, especially sequential route loss.
The United States can build the world's largest military airlift fleet and still be unable to use it, if the airspace between the fleet and the fight is closed. That is the core claim of a new War on the Rocks commentary, and the data behind it deserves a careful read.
In "How Closed Airspace Threatens U.S. Military Mobility Across Eurasia," published October 2, 2026, former cargo airline executive Alex Kolbin argues that war in Ukraine and war involving Iran have narrowed the aerial routes across Eurasia in ways that are persistent and cumulative. The piece is on War on the Rocks. This article summarizes its figures, attributes each one to its source, and adds context.
Why Airspace Matters to a Military
An aircraft needs no road or railway between two points, but it needs permission to cross the land and sea in between. Modern force movement rests on that permission, plus commercial airports, fuel and maintenance, much of it owned by civilian firms. Kolbin writes that the Pentagon "never had to own that entire system to benefit from it."
The historical example he gives is Afghanistan. From 2009, the U.S. used a Northern Distribution Network across Russia and Central Asia. A 2009 U.S.-Russian agreement opened Russian airspace to American military aircraft, including C-17s, and by April 2011 more than 1,000 U.S. supply missions had crossed Russian airspace carrying more than 150,000 personnel, per the commentary. That route no longer exists.
What Is Measured
Kolbin offers several figures to show the civil aviation picture changing. All are from his commentary, which cites industry sources:
- Chinese airlines operated about 55 percent of scheduled China-Europe capacity in summer 2019. By summer 2025 the share was 83 percent, with total capacity flat, because Chinese carriers kept access to Russian airspace and Western carriers lost it.
- Finnair's Helsinki-Tokyo flight time rose from about nine hours to 13, an increase of 44 percent.
- During the latest Middle East disruption, airlines rerouted 1,150 flights a day, adding 206,000 kilometers of flying daily.
- At one point, traffic narrowed to a corridor of roughly 160 kilometers, with Georgia, Azerbaijan, Armenia and Turkey absorbing much of the displaced flow.
These figures describe civil aviation, not military flights. The inference to military mobility is the author's argument, not a measured result.
The Military Side of the Ledger
The commentary cites U.S. Transportation Command's organic fleet at 52 C-5M and 223 C-17 aircraft, matching a requirement for 275 strategic airlifters validated by the last three U.S. mobility studies. It also cites a 2026 Congressional Research Service study noting that the Air Force now operates 222 C-17s after a hull loss, and that one C-17 belongs to the NATO Strategic Airlift Capability. On the author's reading, the usable organic fleet is already below its paper figure.
"Now that adversaries have the ability to contest logistics across the entire spectrum, from point-of-origin to point-of-use," the United States is "fighting to move, instead of moving to fight."
- Gen. Randall Reed, commander, U.S. Transportation Command (2025), as quoted by Kolbin in War on the Rocks
The Civil Reserve Air Fleet is the backup. It commits civilian aircraft to augment military lift. Kolbin notes limits: airlines keep operational control, follow civil safety rules and can refuse missions on risk grounds. During the 2021 Afghanistan evacuation, 18 Civil Reserve Air Fleet aircraft were activated but did not fly into Kabul, per the commentary. As he puts it, the program can augment lift but cannot manufacture overflight rights, accessible airports or acceptable corridors.
The Cumulative Problem
The author's central idea is that losses compound. If the northern route closes, traffic funnels south. If a southern corridor then closes, the second loss costs more than the first would have, because the first already concentrated the traffic. Public mobility studies, he argues, do not model this sequential loss in detail. The 2020 Mobility Capability Requirements Study is classified in full, so outsiders cannot check how far it did.
We cannot test this claim from open sources. It is a logical argument that fits the observed rerouting, not a measured military result.
Why This Connects to Sea Routes
Airlift is the fastest route for people and critical parts, but sea lift carries most heavy equipment. The same logic of cumulative loss applies at sea, where chokepoints such as the Strait of Malacca, the Bab el-Mandeb and Hormuz can narrow routes. Our Bab el-Mandeb analysis and our Malacca dilemma explainer show how a single narrow passage concentrates risk. The maritime chokepoints guide sets them side by side.
Limits and Counterpoints
- Military aircraft do not need civil permission in every case, and the United States has other routes, including polar and Pacific paths and refueling.
- The commentary is by a former airline executive and argues a thesis. Official Transportation Command assessments of overflight constraints are not public.
- The 160-kilometer corridor figure describes one moment, not a permanent state.
Evidence From the Caucasus and the Gulf
Kolbin supports the cumulative argument with traffic data for the corridors that took on the displaced flow. In his figures, Azerbaijan's air navigation system handled about 278 flights a day at the start of 2022 and 695 by the end of 2025, while annual overflights rose from 47,065 in 2021 to 261,085 in 2025. He then shows what happened when the Gulf, the other alternative, was hit: Dubai handled 31.5 million passengers in the first half of 2026, down 31.3 percent year on year, and EUROCONTROL recorded 56 percent fewer flights between the Middle East and Europe on March 31, 2026. These are the author's figures, attributed to the cited sources in his piece. They show concentration and then shock, which is the pattern his thesis predicts.
The military example is smaller but telling. Kolbin reports that Spain denied its airspace and bases to U.S. aircraft supporting attacks on Iran, and that fifteen U.S. aircraft, mostly KC-135 tankers, relocated from Rota and Morón, with at least seven moving to Ramstein in Germany. The distances were still flyable, he writes, but the number of politically usable places from which to support a mission had shrunk. The Aviationist reported on March 30, 2026 that Spain's defence minister, Margarita Robles, said: "We don't authorize either the use of military bases or the use of airspace for actions related to the war in Iran." That is a statement of Spanish government policy, which we report as such. That distinction between physical reach and political access is the most useful idea in the piece.
What Planners Can Do With This
For analysts, the lesson is to count access, not only aircraft. A fleet of 275 airlifters is a capability on paper. A fleet with three usable corridors is a capability in practice. Studies that model contested logistics should include the order in which routes fail, not only the number.
For allies, the lesson is that mobility is shared. The European Union adopted four priority military mobility corridors in March 2025 and allocated 1.69 billion euros under the 2021 to 2027 Connecting Europe Facility, according to the commentary. Investment in dual-use airports, rail and bridges is a mobility measure. It also adds civil traffic that military movements must share, which raises its own risks. Our industrial base guide covers how supply, not only routes, limits what a force can bring to a fight.
Final Assessment
The commentary raises a question worth asking: how much of American military mobility depends on routes and partners that politics can remove? Its civil aviation data are specific and plausible. The leap to military risk is reasoned but unproven in public sources. Readers should hold the thesis as a hypothesis that official studies should test, particularly the cumulative-loss scenario.
Frequently Asked Questions
How many strategic airlifters does the U.S. have?
The commentary cites 52 C-5M and 223 C-17 aircraft, with a 2026 CRS note that 222 C-17s are now operated by the Air Force.
What is contested mobility?
The Government Accountability Office defines it, as quoted by the commentary, as the military's ability to move equipment and personnel in a contested operational environment.
Can the Civil Reserve Air Fleet solve airspace closures?
No. It adds aircraft, but airlines can refuse missions, and it cannot create overflight rights or accessible airports.
Is the cumulative-loss claim proven?
No. It is an argument. Public mobility studies do not show detailed modeling of sequential route losses.