AUKUS Explained: The Submarine Plan, the Timeline and the Production Bottleneck
By Declan Farr · November 13, 2026
Category: defense-geopolitical-news
What AUKUS Pillar 1 is, the dates for Australia's Virginia-class submarines, and why U.S. production of about 1.1 boats a year is the constraint.
Key takeaways
The problem AUKUS is described as a settled plan, but its timeline depends on U.S. submarine production that is running below target.
Core insight Pillar 1 sells three to five Virginia-class boats to Australia from fiscal 2032, while production is about 1.1 to 1.2 boats a year against a goal of 2.0.
Practical outcome Watch the Virginia-class production rate and the 2027 rotations rather than political statements.
AUKUS is easy to describe and hard to build. Australia is to buy three to five U.S. nuclear-powered attack submarines and later build its own, and the arrangement's central constraint is that U.S. shipyards are producing about one Virginia-class submarine a year when the plan assumes two.
This explainer uses the Congressional Research Service's January 26, 2026 report on the Virginia-class program and AUKUS Pillar 1, the most detailed public source on the plan. It sets out what the partnership is, what each phase involves, the stated timeline and the main arguments for and against.
What AUKUS Is
In September 2021, the governments of Australia, the United Kingdom and the United States announced a security partnership with two main areas of effort, called pillars. Pillar 2 covers advanced capabilities. Pillar 1 is the submarine project, which is the focus of this article. It has three elements, according to CRS:
- Rotational deployment of four U.S. and one UK nuclear-powered attack submarines (SSNs) out of a port in Western Australia.
- Sale of three to five Virginia-class SSNs to Australia, with replacement boats built for the U.S. Navy.
- U.S. and UK assistance for an Australian effort to build three to five more SSNs of a new UK-Australian design, to complete a planned eight-boat Australian force.
Congress approved the enabling legislation in the fiscal 2024 NDAA. In June 2025, the Defense Department reportedly began a review of Pillar 1, and in early December 2025 Trump administration officials publicly affirmed support for AUKUS including Pillar 1, per CRS. Details of the review were not disclosed.
The Timeline
- 2027 at the earliest: U.S. and UK forward rotations of SSNs out of HMAS Stirling near Perth are to begin, eventually reaching one UK boat and up to four Virginia-class boats.
- Fiscal 2032 and 2035: sale of the first two Virginia-class boats, existing boats with 18 to 27 years of remaining service life.
- Fiscal 2038: sale of a third boat, new from the U.S. production line with a full 33-year service life.
- Up to two more boats: possible if needed.
CRS notes that the three boats together would transfer more than 70 boat-years of SSN capability from the U.S. Navy to Australia.
The Production Problem
The plan depends on U.S. submarine production. The Navy has procured Virginia-class boats since fiscal 1998, with 41 procured through fiscal 2025, and has procured them at a rate of two per year from fiscal 2011 to 2024. The actual production rate has never reached 2.0 per year and, since 2022, has been about 1.1 to 1.2 per year, leaving a growing backlog, per CRS. Estimated cost under the fiscal 2026 submission is about $5.0 billion per boat at the two-per-year rate. The Navy and industry are working to raise production to 2.0 boats per year and then 2.33 to cover the AUKUS replacements and reduce the backlog. Congress has appropriated billions of dollars of submarine industrial base funding since fiscal 2018. The Government Accountability Office, in April 2026 testimony, found that the submarine industrial base has not met construction goals in recent years and that the Defense Department has already invested more than $10 billion in it while not yet knowing how much more it will need, per the GAO summary.
Production is tied to workforce, which we analyze in our report on the Navy's shipyard worker shortage, and to suppliers, as our article on Anduril's Arsenal-2 and submarine components explains.
Arguments For and Against
Supporters, as CRS records the arguments, point to the value of Australian basing and capability in the Indo-Pacific and to the deterrent value of shared submarine operations. Critics raise cost, risk to U.S. submarine availability and technology security. CRS records the argument that the U.S. attack submarine force faces a projected "valley": under the Navy's fiscal 2025 plan the force would fall to 47 boats in fiscal 2030 and rise to 50 by fiscal 2032, not counting the effect of selling boats to Australia. A recorded argument from critics is that the plan's timing limits near-term benefit.
"Pillar 1 as currently structured would not increase the total number of SSNs available for performing U.S., UK, and Australian SSN missions above what it otherwise would have been until sometime in the 2040s."
- Argument recorded in the Congressional Research Service report on the Virginia-class program and AUKUS
That is an argument and not a settled finding. The counterargument, also recorded by CRS and widely made, is that the plan builds Australian capability and industrial capacity that would not otherwise exist.
What It Means for the Indo-Pacific
Submarines matter in the Pacific because of distance and because anti-access systems threaten surface ships and bases. Our guides to A2/AD and to the Indo-Pacific chokepoints explain why undersea forces are a core part of deterrence there. For the Chinese side of the balance, see our Taiwan Strait data summary.
What to Watch
- The Virginia-class production rate, with 2.0 per year as the milestone.
- The start of rotational deployments from Western Australia, due as early as 2027.
- Congressional action on submarine industrial base funding and the Navy's next shipbuilding plan.
How the Money Moves
Three funding streams support the plan, according to CRS. Annual shipbuilding appropriations buy the boats, and the fiscal 2026 request sought two Virginia-class boats at about $5.0 billion each at the two-per-year rate. Submarine industrial base funding, appropriated since fiscal 2018, pays for supplier expansion and workforce. And the 2025 reconciliation law provided $4.6 billion for a second Virginia-class submarine in fiscal 2026, a footnote in the CRS report notes. Only a single boat was procured in fiscal 2025, so the second boat in fiscal 2026 matters to the schedule. Funding that comes through reconciliation or a continuing resolution carries timing risk, which we discuss in our article on the delayed new starts.
CRS also records a concern that is easy to miss. The sale of existing Virginia-class boats to Australia removes hulls from the U.S. fleet at a time when the force is already in a projected valley. The plan therefore rests on the assumption that replacement boats will be built on schedule. If production stays near 1.2 boats a year, the replacements arrive late, and the U.S. force stays smaller than planned, while the Australian boats still depart in the 2030s. That is the exposure that critics cite, and the reason the Navy and Congress track production so closely.
The other side of the argument is also in the CRS record: building Australian industrial capacity and an Australian base for allied submarines creates capability that the United States could not otherwise have in the Indian and Pacific Oceans. How to weigh those factors is a policy judgment, and the reader should hold both in view.
Final Assessment
AUKUS is a long program with a defined sequence of dates and a single clear bottleneck. The strategic case depends on whether U.S. shipyards reach two boats a year, a rate they have not reached in the program's history. Watch production numbers more closely than political statements.
Frequently Asked Questions
What is AUKUS?
A 2021 security partnership of Australia, the UK and the U.S. with two pillars. Pillar 1 covers nuclear-powered submarines and Pillar 2 covers advanced capabilities.
When will Australia get Virginia-class submarines?
CRS reports sales in fiscal 2032 and 2035 of existing boats and fiscal 2038 of a new boat, with up to two more possible.
Why is production a problem?
Virginia-class production has been about 1.1 to 1.2 boats a year since 2022, below the two-a-year rate the plan assumes.
Does the Trump administration support AUKUS?
In December 2025, administration officials publicly affirmed support for AUKUS including Pillar 1, after a Pentagon review, per CRS.